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In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, lapses in federal policy-making and a lack of state 
level enforcement paved the way for employer exploitation of predominantly Latino 
migrant workers, transforming working-class Latino newcomers into the newest class of 
storm victims in post-Katrina New Orleans.  In essence, a “rebuild above all else” 
recovery scenario took hold between 2005-2007 in which immediate reconstruction of 
the city took priority over the participation of local, African-American workers and the 
protection of immigrant worker rights.  Despite their disadvantaged position, however, 
migrant workers did not remain passive victims to injustice but actively organized against 
employer abuse and intimidation by law enforcement and immigration officials.  Latino 
worker activists and their allies sternly rejected the “rebuild above all else” recovery 
model championed by local, state and federal government policies and sought to carve 
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“Standing on the corner, one becomes a day laborer, a victim of many abuses.  Police 
harassment, immigration raids, contractors not paying you and even threatening you 
with weapons. These abuses make you a victim but at the same time give you courage to 
change the situation” 
-- Denis Soriano, New Orleans day laborer and organizer1 
 
Introduction 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, a storm considered one of the worst 
natural disasters in United States history, struck the Louisiana and Mississippi Gulf 
Coast. Over the following months, Denis Soriano, like thousands of other Latino migrant 
workers, traveled to the devastated city of New Orleans, Louisiana, to find work in the 
rebuilding effort as demand for labor spiked.  “At first we were getting paid well. We 
made in a week demolishing and gutting buildings what we had been making in a month 
in Tennessee.  We said, ‘How cool,’” Soriano, a Honduran immigrant, reflected.  “But it 
was hard work, without any kind of safety protections.  So a lot of our friends got sick 
with the flu and developed allergies.  After working for a contractor for twenty-two days, 
the contractor fired us, still owing us $3,000. He never paid us a penny,” lamented 
Soriano.2 This story, similar to those of many Latino migrant workers in New Orleans 
after the hurricane, reveals both the opportunity and hardship that migrants encountered 
upon arrival.  As Soriano quickly realized, in post-Katrina New Orleans migrant labor 
abuses prevailed in the reconstruction economy.   
What economic, social and political factors facilitated Latino worker migration to 
hurricane-ravaged New Orleans? Under what circumstances did migrant workers become 
both victims and resisters of workplace abuses in the post-Katrina landscape from 2005-
2007? What do transnational stories of Latino migrant workers reveal about the 
confluences of displacement, disaster recovery, immigration and labor organizing in New 
Orleans?  How can the perspectives of Latino immigrant workers, displaced New 
Orleanians, contractors, elected officials, and government agency representatives – all 
stakeholders in the rebuilding of New Orleans – add to our understanding of Katrina’s 
impact on the city?  
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This paper seeks to chronicle post-Katrina immigrant labor experiences and 
situate them within a larger context of Latino migration, disaster recovery and immigrant 
activism in the New South.  It builds upon previous scholarship about Hispanic migration 
and worker activism in other areas of the American South during the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries. Through the lens of migration, political economy, race and 
labor organizing, this research attempts to deepen our understanding of the social and 
political history of the most destructive disaster in American history.  
Drawing on federal government records, newspaper articles, legal cases, 
organizational reports, and oral history testimonies from workers, this paper chronicles 
Latino migrant worker experiences in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina from 2005 to 
2007.  First, I highlight demographic changes that occurred by comparing the New 
Orleans area Latino community before and after the storm.  Next, I turn to federal labor, 
immigration and workplace safety policy changes that influenced worker migration and 
the political economy of rebuilding New Orleans.  The story of Denis Soriano, a 
Honduran immigrant, illustrates the push and pull factors that shaped many immigrant 
workers’ experiences.  I then focus on the roles that race, class and perceptions of job 
competition played in shaping the debate on Latino worker migration to New Orleans. I 
provide evidence for workplace abuses and conclude with an examination of civil society 
organizing responses to employer abuse and federal immigration enforcement. Though 
worker resistance took on a variety of forms in the hurricane’s aftermath, I focus on the 
efforts of day laborers to garner fair wages, combat rights violations and build inter-racial 
alliances with local organizations.            
Based on this research, I argue that lapses in federal policy-making and a lack of 
state level enforcement paved the way for employer exploitation of predominantly Latino 
migrant workers, transforming working-class Latino newcomers into the newest class of 
storm victims in post-Katrina New Orleans.  In essence, a “rebuild above all else” 
recovery scenario took hold between 2005-2007 in which immediate reconstruction of 
the city took priority over the participation of local, African-American workers and the 
protection of immigrant worker rights.  Despite their disadvantaged position, however, 
migrant workers did not remain passive victims to injustice but actively organized against 
employer abuse and intimidation by law enforcement and immigration officials.  Latino 
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worker activists and their allies sternly rejected the “rebuild above all else” recovery 
model championed by local, state and federal government policies and sought to carve 
out an alternative rebuilding model that respected immigrant labor rights. 
 
Latino Communities in Pre-Katrina New Orleans   
The Hispanic population in the New Orleans metropolitan area before Hurricane 
Katrina was relatively small and largely comprised of multi-generation Central 
Americans.  While Mexicans comprised the bulk of Latin American immigrants to the  
U. S. South from 1990-2000, Hondurans represented the largest Latino sub-group in 
greater New Orleans beginning in the 1970s.3  Well-developed commercial and social 
ties between New Orleans and Honduras contributed to Honduran migration to New 
Orleans in the first half of the twentieth century.  U.S.-based Standard and United Fruit 
companies exported much of their Honduran-grown banana crops through the Port of 
New Orleans from the 1900s until the 1960s, facilitating the employment and settlement 
of Hondurans in the New Orleans area.4  A combination of political unrest, 
unemployment and natural disasters during the 1950s prompted thousands of Hondurans 
to migrate to the city in the following decades.5  By 1970, Hondurans constituted the 
metropolitan area’s largest Hispanic population.6  Meanwhile, beginning in the early 
1960s, immigrants from other Latin American countries began legally migrating to New 
Orleans in greater numbers.7   Immigrants from Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and elsewhere in the hemisphere 
settled in Jefferson and Orleans Parishes where they constructed small, working- and 
middle-class communities.8  
Foreign-born Hispanics and their descendents developed well-established 
communities in New Orleans and surrounding suburbs in the second half of the twentieth 
century.  Beginning in the 1950s, immigrants from Central America and the Caribbean 
clustered in various neighborhoods around the city, constructing small yet tight-knit 
social networks.9  Many Latino immigrants worked in family-owned businesses while 
others procured work in a variety of industries including shipping, light manufacturing 
and the service economy. Mary Karen Bracken suggests that before the 1980s, few 
Latino civic and political organizations existed, and Hispanic assimilation into American 
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culture was prevalent.10  During the 1980s, however, Latino business organizations, 
churches, civic and political groups, cultural events and ethnic media proliferated.  The 
Latin American Apostolate (later renamed the Hispanic Apostolate), for instance, became 
an important outreach vehicle for the Catholic Church through its religious ministry and 
sponsorship of popular cultural events such as the Mensaje Festival.  Spanish language 
radio programs and newspapers gave first- and second-generation Latino New Orleanians 
more options in entertainment and news.  Louisiana’s first Hispanic Chamber of 
Commerce also formed during the decade.11  Many of these organizations, including 
Hispanic church parishes, community groups, sports teams and small businesses existed 
in the metropolitan area when Hurricane Katrina hit in the summer of 2005.   
Foreign-born Latino migration to Louisiana did not match the high rates of 
migration to “new gateway” southern states during the fifteen years prior to Katrina. 
Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee and North and South Carolina experienced more than a 
thirty percent increase in their foreign-born populations; Louisiana, on the other hand, 
saw its immigrant populations grew by only six percent.12  Not surprisingly, low-wage 
Latino migration to southern cities since the early 1990s has corresponded to economic 
growth of metropolitan areas.13  Fueled by a booming construction industry, high 
economic growth from 1990 to 2000 in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina (which 
includes Charlotte), for instance, was directly linked to the 500 percent increase in the 
county’s Latino population.14  In contrast, the mainstays of the south Louisiana regional 
economy – port services, oil and gas, tourism and fishing – failed to spark the high 
economic and population growth generated by construction, service and technology 
industries elsewhere in the southern United States during the late twentieth century.15    
As of August 2005, a blend of African Americans, whites and foreign-born (including 
Latino) residents occupied the low-wage construction jobs in New Orleans that Latino 
immigrants were disproportionately performing in other southern cities with more 
dynamic economies.  Following Katrina, however, New Orleans would join the ranks of 
“new gateway” cities in the U.S. South as the immigrant construction worker population 
ballooned.  
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Hurricane Katrina’s Destruction 
In the early morning hours of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall 
east of New Orleans.16  Over the next five hours, the Category 3 hurricane ravaged the 
metropolitan area’s neighborhoods and infrastructure.  High winds and torrential rain 
destroyed roofs and ripped down power lines.  Funneled through the Mississippi River 
Gulf Outlet and New Orleans’ drainage canals, a twenty-foot storm surge breached three 
of the city’s levees, flooding eighty percent of Orleans Parish.17  The floods wiped out 
entire neighborhoods, while claiming the lives of over one thousand residents.18  By late 
morning, Katrina had crept northward, displacing hundreds of thousands of Gulf Coast 
residents.19    
The hurricane’s force, ensuing levee breaches and subsequent flooding 
transformed New Orleans into a decimated and depopulated city.  Thousands of houses, 
apartments, businesses and government buildings were completely destroyed while 
thousands more suffered severe damage.  Reconstruction of New Orleans required a 
robust workforce to carry out demolition, gutting, mud and waste removal, roofing, sheet-
rock installation and garbage pick-up.  But in a matter of days New Orleans’ pre-Katrina 
population of nearly 440,000 people had been whittled down to several thousand.20  
Accordingly, the number of workers employed in construction and related industries in 
Orleans Parish dropped by nearly half (from 40,100 to 22,500) from August to September 
2005.21  The city’s drastically reduced labor supply represented a salient obstacle to 
immediate reconstruction of the city, provoking the federal government to take action. 
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Federal Policy Responses 
           Citing the extraordinarily devastating nature of Katrina and the urgency to bolster 
rebuilding efforts, the George W. Bush administration made key policy changes 
immediately following the disaster that reconfigured the post-hurricane landscape of 
labor and capital.  Within days of the flooding, the executive branch temporarily 
suspended federal labor, immigration and workplace safety laws to expedite the hiring of 
reconstruction workers and enable contractors to proceed as quickly as possible with 
recovery.  These actions included the suspension of prevailing construction wages, I-9 
employment verification requirements, and Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) regulations.   A review of each of these Katrina-tailored policies 
will demonstrate how their interaction contributed to Latino worker migration to New 
Orleans and resulted in a rebuilding effort that insufficiently protected worker rights. 
 President George W. Bush’s suspension of prevailing construction wages one 
week after Katrina devastated the Gulf South ignited a heated debate over how the federal 
government should facilitate reconstruction of the region.  On September 8, 2005, the 
President suspended by executive order key provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act, a 
Depression-era labor law that requires federally funded construction or service 
contractors to pay no less than the prevailing wage rates for private construction workers 
in a given region of the country.  Crafted in 1931, a time when private contractors 
competed for numerous government public works contracts and wage depression was 
prevalent, Davis-Bacon was established to ensure that government contract allocation did 
not undercut workers’ wages.22   The Act grants the President the authority to suspend the 
law during a time of “national emergency,” though the term is not specifically defined in 
the statute.23  On October 14, 1992, President George H. W. Bush suspended the Act in 
areas of Florida and Louisiana impacted by Hurricane Andrew, a situation he described 
as a “national emergency” in which “the wage rates imposed by the Davis-Bacon Act 
increase the cost to the Federal Government of providing federal assistance to those 
areas.”24   
Thirteen years later, the George W. Bush administration would suspend Davis 
Bacon as well.  Supporters of the law’s post-Katrina suspension similarly argued that 
prevailing wage guarantees would only inflate the cost of reconstruction in the Gulf 
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South and slow down the rebuilding process.25  Charlie Norwood, Republican 
congressional representative from Georgia, praised President Bush for his “quick action 
to strip away unnecessary bureaucracy that may hamper our ability to recover.”  He 
continued, “[The country] can’t afford that kind of inefficiency, red tape, and inflated 
costs when we have an entire region to rebuild, largely at taxpayer expense.”26 Contractor 
trade groups also backed Davis Bacon’s suspension and resisted its reinstatement. M. 
Kirk Pickerel, chief executive of Associated Builders and Contractors, remarked that  
“certain special interests and their allies in Congress are more concerned about reinstating 
this wasteful and outdated act than they are with fairly and expeditiously reconstructing 
the devastated areas.”27 
In contrast, labor unions and elected officials on both sides of the aisle were 
outraged at President Bush’s suspension of Davis-Bacon and vigorously pushed for the 
law’s reinstatement.  Every House Democrat and thirty-seven House Republicans went 
on record to criticize the suspension.28  With the law’s temporary repeal and the absence 
of a Louisiana state minimum wage law, contractors and subcontractors hired by the 
federal government were free to cut construction workers’ pay to the federal minimum 
wage, a scant $5.15 per hour. This was four dollars per hour lower than the already low 
prevailing wage levels in the hurricane-affected Gulf States prior to Katrina.29 Before the 
disaster, prevailing wage rates for construction workers in Louisiana, for instance, were 
the fifteenth lowest in the country; a prevailing wage for a carpenter in New Orleans was 
roughly $12 per hour in August 2005, eight dollars lower than the national average.30 
Though most construction workers in the region seem to have earned more than the 
minimum wage in the nearly two months the Act was overturned, Davis-Bacon’s 
suspension succeeded in reducing otherwise higher wages amidst a heightened labor 
demand.  Union leaders expressed these concerns in a letter to Congress, stating that the 
people of the Gulf South “have gone through so much and now the administration wants 
them to sacrifice decent pay.”  “We don’t hear contractors being asked to work for a 
reduced profit,” they complained.31     
Reinstatement proponents also argued that suspension of prevailing wages 
funneled rebuilding jobs to low-wage migrant workers rather than displaced residents, 
with contractors reaping windfall profits.  The Democratic Policy Committee, chaired by 
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Democratic Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota, protested that Davis-Bacon’s 
suspension “created a bonanza for contractors paying cut-rate wages and providing 
inadequate benefits.” “The results have been predictable,” it said. “Instead of providing 
jobs to displaced local workers, contractors have hired out-of-state migrant workers 
willing to accept minimal compensation,” the committee protested.32  In support of his 
October 7 reinstatement proposal, Ohio Republican congressman Steven LaTourette 
expressed similar concern, suggesting that “There are thousands of skilled Gulf Coast 
workers who should be working to rebuild their communities.  Companies are passing 
them by and hiring cheap unskilled illegal workers to beef up their bottom line,” he 
decried.33 Louisiana Democratic Senator Mary Landreiu concurred with LaTourette in an 
October 18 letter to Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Michael 
Chertoff, in which she portrayed migrant workers as job-stealers, calling for stepped-up 
immigration enforcement in the region.  She argued, “While my state experiences 
unemployment rates not seen since the Great Depression, it is unconscionable that illegal 
workers would be brought into Louisiana aggravating our employment crisis and 
depressing earning for our workers.”34  Critics of the Bush administration’s handling of 
the recovery effort, then, blamed both Davis-Bacon’s suspension and immigrant workers 
for channeling jobs away from displaced Gulf workers, a tension that would definitively 
shape work and labor organizing in post-Katrina New Orleans.  
 Growing bi-partisan pressure for Davis-Bacon’s renewal eventually proved 
effective.  By late October, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card had conceded to 
Democrat and Republican representatives that “there appeared to be no savings garnered 
from suspending the Davis-Bacon Act.”35  President Bush reinstated Davis-Bacon on 
November 3, 2005.36  Its restoration, however, was not retroactive, applying only to 
contracts “for which bids are opened or negotiations concluded on or after November 8, 
2005.”37  Given that the bulk of federal reconstruction contracts had been signed during 
the two months the law had been suspended, most government contractors were not 
obligated to pay prevailing wages on Katrina-related contracts.   
 The Davis-Bacon Act’s suspension was significant for several reasons.  It created 
the conditions in which wages were held down in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, the 
period in which most rebuilding contracts were awarded and workers hired. 
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Reconstruction employment opportunities, as a partial consequence of this, largely went 
to low-wage migrant workers, who were more likely to work for lower pay than local, 
native-born workers accustomed to earning higher prevailing wages. The Democratic 
Policy Committee and other critics argued that the law’s suspension pushed wages below 
a living wage in New Orleans, creating disincentives for displaced residents to return.38  
But for many immigrant workers, less than prevailing construction wages in the Gulf 
South were still a clear improvement over lower wages they received as agricultural 
workers, meat processors or service industry employees.39   The fact that about thirty 
percent of the U. S. construction force in 2003 was born in Mexico or Central America 
and that Latinos filled most new construction jobs created between the second quarters of 
2005 and 2006 suggest, though, that Davis Bacon’s suspension certainly did not act alone 
in facilitating the movement of low-wage Latino workers to New Orleans.40  As 
immigration scholar Wayne Cornelius has shown, demand for low-wage Latino 
immigrant labor became more “structurally embedded” in the U. S. economy during the 
1990s and would continue into the 2000s.41  The segmentation of certain job markets into 
“immigrant” jobs, such as low-skilled construction labor, signals that when Katrina hit, 
most contractors in the country were already relying on a steady stream of both legal and 
undocumented immigrant workers to meet labor demands.  The post-Katrina climate was 
different insofar as the suspension of prevailing wages and employment verification 
requirements expedited worker migration and rebuilding, with Latino migrant workers 
bearing exceptional risk to labor abuses, to be discussed at length below.     
 The federal government’s relaxing of employer compliance with immigration 
regulations also helped create the conditions for increased Latino worker migration to 
New Orleans.42  On September 6, 2005, DHS temporarily suspended enforcement of 
sanctions against employers who hired individuals without I-9 documents, the paperwork 
normally required to verify employment eligibility.43   Though officially intended to 
expedite the hiring of hurricane victims, the two-month suspension effectively loosened 
immigration law to legally permit contractors to hire undocumented immigrant workers.44  
Amplified presence of U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the 
region, however, muddied the waters for undocumented migrants and their immigration 
status. On September 8, 2005, two days after DHS relaxed hiring requirements, ICE 
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announced it had deployed over 725 staff to the region, including armed personnel from 
Detention and Removal Operations.45  ICE spokeswoman Virginia Kice emphasized that 
the agency’s principal role was to help save lives and provide security in the recovery 
effort.46  Over the next month, however, immigrant rights organizations and victim 
advocacy groups reported that ICE raids and deportations of Latinos were occurring at 
Red Cross shelters in the region.47  By early October, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus 
had taken notice of the reports and called into question the sincerity of DHS’ stated goals 
in the region to assist all hurricane victims.48  The Caucus deplored the department’s 
position that undocumented workers and their families who seek aid from relief agencies 
would not be protected from arrest and deportation.49  Drawing attention to reports of 
ICE racial profiling of Latino immigrant hurricane victims, many of whom likely entered 
the country legally, Representative Robert Menendez of New Jersey asked, “Is there no 
humanity left in our government?”50 But Louisiana Democratic Senator Mary Landreiu 
supported the deployment and pushed for even greater ICE presence to help ensure that 
undocumented workers did not take jobs away from displaced Gulf Coast residents.  In 
late October 2005 she requested that DHS deploy additional immigration enforcement 
personnel to the Gulf Coast and institute a zero-tolerance policy of undocumented worker 
employment in federally funded contracts.51 
Why, then, did the Bush administration ostensibly send the mixed message that 
undocumented migrant workers were simultaneously welcome to gain employment in the 
Gulf South while also under an apparently heightened threat of deportation? Though 
formulated within the context of post-Katrina recovery planning, increased ICE 
deployment also was likely a response to post-September 11, 2001 concerns over 
immigration and security. Nonetheless, undocumented workers’ immigration status and 
levels of risk became that much more uncertain.  Similarly, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s (FEMA) failure to guarantee that undocumented hurricane 
victims would not be arrested and handed over to immigration authorities led to 
confusion and sparked controversy at the local and national level.52  Suspension of labor 
and immigration laws coupled with beefed-up ICE deployment effectively ensured that 
New Orleans could court and exploit a cheap labor source at the same time it distanced 
itself from the politically unpopular consequences of an inevitable demographic change.   
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In addition to suspending labor and immigration laws, the Bush administration 
temporarily revoked federal workplace safety laws in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.  On 
August 30, 2005, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) suspended 
enforcement of job safety and health standards in various counties and parishes heavily 
damaged by the storm.  The agency argued that it would be able to provide “faster and 
more flexible responses to hazards facing workers involved in the cleanup and 
recovery.”53 OSHA regulations remained suspended in New Orleans until January 20, 
2006.54  
Together, then, the suspension of federal labor, immigration and workplace safety 
laws significantly influenced Latino migration, labor conditions, and the political 
economy of post-Katrina New Orleans. President Bush’s suspension of the Davis-Bacon 
Act and DHS relaxing of employer sanctions for hiring undocumented immigrants in 
September 2005 made it easier for employers to hire undocumented migrant workers and 
pay lower than prevailing wages in the rebuilding effort. These actions streamlined 
recovery efforts, but they also raised contractor profits at the expense of prevailing wages 
and labor rights.   Similarly, the suspension of OSHA workplace safety standards left 
workers vulnerable to dangerous post-flood work environments.  ICE raids in New 
Orleans, especially of day labor sites, would increase during 2006, lending weight to 
suspicions that with a decline in labor demand, Latino migrant workers would 
increasingly become targets of arrest and possible deportation.55  As immigration scholar 
Jorge Bustamante suggested, “Katrina is producing a large demand for undocumented 
workers.  That’s why they’re bending the rules.  But then once the job is done, it’s back 
in the shadows.  The hypocrisy is astounding.”56    
In sum, the Bush administration’s suspension of federal labor, immigration and 
workplace safety laws helped create a “rebuild-above-all-else” climate that shaped the 
on-the-ground reality of the rebuilding of New Orleans between 2005-2007.  This policy 
framework prioritized streamlined hiring processes and labor market efficiency over 
maintaining living wages for workers and, as described in more detail later, enforcing 
labor rights.  As a result of these policy responses as well as the “structural 
embeddedness” of Latinos in the construction industry, worker social networks, and 
employer recruitment, tens of thousands of foreign-born migrant workers – 
  
12 
predominantly Latino and many undocumented – traveled to New Orleans in search of 
work, coming to represent the bulk of New Orleans’ rebuilding workforce.  
 
Latino Worker Migration to New Orleans 
Latino worker migration to post-Katrina New Orleans transformed the 
demographic profile of the metropolitan area’s Hispanic community. Hispanics 
comprised between two to three percent of Louisiana’s total population and four percent 
of the New Orleans metropolitan area in 2000 (compared to 12.5% nationally).57  As of 
August 29, 2005, Latinos represented a relatively small contingent of the greater New 
Orleans population, amounting to approximately 63,000 individuals or six percent of the 
area’s total population of nearly 1.2 million.58 Although the actual size of the area’s pre-
Katrina Latino population (documented and undocumented) is difficult to pinpoint, 
Latinos were still considerably fewer in number than the area’s white and African-
American populations.59  As thousands of migrant workers – estimated between 30,000 
and 100,000 – arrived in the wake of the storm, Latino demographics, such as population 
size, country of origin, age, gender, and occupation, noticeably shifted.60  Over the next 
year, a new and robust community of mostly male, working-class migrant workers from 
throughout Latin America augmented a modestly sized and predominantly middle-class 
Hispanic population.  
The workforce that migrated to New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina was 
diverse in terms of race, national origin, immigration/citizenship status and means of 
arrival.  Although nearly half of the construction workers in April 2006 were thought to 
be Latino, of whom 54 percent were estimated to be undocumented, New Orleans’ post-
Katrina migrant workforce also included African Americans, Native Americans, Asian 
Americans, and whites.61  Upon learning about work opportunities in the devastated, 
labor-hungry Gulf South, Latinos migrated to the region from within the United States as 
well as abroad, as documented and undocumented laborers.  Some workers came on their 
own, while others were recruited directly by employers.  
In the aftermath of the storm, rebuilding contractors recruited Latino workers 
within and outside the U. S. to fill the labor shortage, promising workers high wages of 
up to $17 per hour in addition to free food, lodging, and transportation.62   Migrants were 
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recruited as individuals and in small groups while others were hired in swaths of 
thousands to undertake large-scale contracts, such as FEMA trailer installation.63  
Meanwhile, thousands of Latin American guestworkers arrived with non-agricultural 
worker (H2-B) visas, allowing them to be temporarily employed in the United States but 
exclusively by the employer who sponsored their visa.64  Many guestworkers were 
recruited directly by hiring agencies who advertised and set up offices in the workers’ 
home countries.  Human rights investigations and lawsuits from 2005-07 documented 
numerous cases in which H2-B recruitment not only led to violations of workers’ federal 
labor rights, but also took the form of human trafficking.65  
Though fewer in number than Latino migrant workers already residing in the  
U. S. at the time of the hurricane, undocumented workers living in Mexico and Central 
America also migrated directly to New Orleans in search of well-paying reconstruction 
work.66  Some commentators cautioned that the rebuilding effort would lead to waves of 
illegal immigration into the United States. An April 2006 survey by the University of 
California at Los Angeles and Tulane University, however, suggested that the majority of 
undocumented migrant workers resided in the United States prior to Hurricane Katrina.67  
In other cases, undocumented Latino immigrants migrated to the U. S. soon after the 
hurricane but without being recruited for reconstruction work until months later.  Denis 
Soriano, who was living in his native Honduras when the storm hit, had first attempted to 
emigrate to the U. S. three years earlier.    
 
One Migrant’s Journey to New Orleans 
In 2002, fifteen-year-old Denis Soriano decided to leave Honduras for the United 
States.68  Many of his neighbors from his rural hometown of Santa Barbara, Honduras, 
had already made the journey and were sending monthly remittances to support their 
families.  In search of economic opportunities the struggling Honduran economy could 
not offer him, Soriano crossed the Guatemalan and Mexican borders on foot en route to 
the United States. “The first time was a very difficult trip. You’re not from [Mexico], 
you’re hiding from the police, from immigration. You have little money and nowhere to 
eat or to sleep,” recalled Soriano.  He continued, “We jumped onto [freight] trains. We 
suffered a lot. We were assaulted and robbed for the little money we had.  It really 
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affected me psychologically to see other migrants killed by thieves or run over by trains.”  
Without money or contacts in the U. S. to support his continued trek northward, 
Soriano’s journey ended in the central Mexican city of San Luis Potosi.  He eventually 
found work but returned to his family in Honduras a year and a half later.69 
The only boy and oldest of five children, Soriano had always been his father’s 
“right-hand man.”70  Since his youth, he had helped his father plow the tropical soil of 
their eight-acre plot and harvest the beans, corn, tomatoes, coffee and sugarcane they 
planted each year.  They ate what they grew and sold the surplus.  Like most campesinos 
(small farmers), the Soriano family struggled to overcome the historical challenges of 
making ends meet in rural Honduras, including limited access to credit and low crop 
prices.  The 2005 Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) rendered many 
small Honduran farmers’ products uncompetitive as cheaper U. S. food imports 
inundated local markets.  For the Sorianos, like many Central American families, 
CAFTA ignited a new wave of economic instability. As the price of coffee and other cash 
crops fell, Soriano felt increasingly responsible for his family’s economic welfare.  
Among his chief concerns were making sure his sisters had school supplies and that the 
family had enough to eat. “When I saw that my father was falling into debt because of 
illnesses my mother and my sisters had, I saw that out of obligation to support my family 
I had to migrate again,” Soriano remembered.  Now nineteen, Soriano set off once more 
for the U. S. in the fall of 2005.  After a month-long journey through Mexico, 
complicated by a lack of food and extortion by Mexican immigration officials, Soriano 
arrived in northern Mexico.  A coyote or pollero – a guide hired by undocumented 
migrants to illegally cross the U. S.–Mexico border – led him across the Rio Bravo (Rio 
Grande River) into Texas, weeks after Hurricane Katrina.71  
For Soriano, like many other immigrant workers, media and social networks 
among family and friends were driving factors that encouraged workers to seek out 
construction jobs in New Orleans.72 “I had been living in Tennessee for two months when 
several friends came to New Orleans to look for construction work. They started telling 
us that there was a lot of work.  Four more friends went to New Orleans and a week later, 
they told us that there was a lot of work.  So we quit our jobs and came here.  This was in 
February 2006,” recalled Soriano.73  In addition to federal policy responses in the 
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immediate aftermath of the disaster, social networks and direct employer recruitment 
(within and outside of the U. S.) also played pivotal roles in attracting a migrant 
workforce to rebuild New Orleans.  As more Hispanics moved to the metropolitan area 
for work, race, immigration and job competition became more salient public opinion 
issues in the rebuilding process of the Crescent City.      
 
Race, Class, and Job Competition in Katrina’s Aftermath  
Race and class notably conditioned how tens of thousands New Orleanians 
experienced Hurricane Katrina.  African Americans, who made up sixty-seven percent of 
the city’s population prior to the hurricane, were disproportionately affected by flooding 
and confronted considerable obstacles to returning.74   Pre-existing conditions of poverty, 
a dearth of adequate and affordable housing, and reduced personal financial resources 
contributed to many working-class black families’ delayed return or permanent 
displacement.75  Unable to come back quickly and hampered by federal suspension of 
affirmative action laws and a no-bid contract award system that favored out-of-state 
employers, these predominantly poor and black residents were left on the sidelines of the 
New Orleans rebuilding economy. More flexible in their willingness to work for lower 
wages and stay in motels, makeshift campgrounds, abandoned houses and jobs sites, 
Latino migrant workers arrived to fill the post-disaster labor demand.76  These workers 
were welcomed for their labor, but they also encountered disgruntled residents and public 
officials who saw the newcomers as job-stealers.      
By early September 2005, DHS and FEMA began awarding thousands of 
rebuilding contracts to mostly large, out-of-state contractors.  Worth billions of dollars, 
less than half were competitively bid.77  In response to complaints about the process, 
FEMA claimed that local construction enterprises were unavailable in the aftermath of 
the hurricane when the work was being dispensed.78  Consequently, many local 
contractors were unable to procure contracts, with African-American and other minority-
owned businesses receiving only a fraction of awarded contracts.  By October 4, 2005, 
only 1.5 percent of $1.6 billion in FEMA-awarded contracts had gone to minority-owned 
businesses, rather than the five percent normally required.79  The Department of Labor 
(DOL) suspended affirmative action procedures for federal contractors in September 
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2005, representing another obstacle for black New Orleanian workers to secure 
employment in the rebuilding effort.80   
 The delayed return of displaced New Orleanians and rapid arrival of 
predominantly foreign-born reconstruction workers generated a climate of mixed feelings 
toward Latino newcomers.  Some locals understood that a large workforce willing to 
carry out the unpleasant jobs of gutting flooded homes and buildings was needed to 
rebuild the city and were thankful for the migrant workers’ presence in the wake of the 
disaster. Other residents, including public officials, however, expressed fears about 
migrants out-competing native-born workers for rebuilding jobs. Addressing a local 
business forum in October 2005, Mayor Ray Nagin asked bluntly, “How do I ensure that 
New Orleans is not overrun by Mexican workers?” 81  After civil rights organizations 
denounced his comments, the mayor clarified that he only meant that residents should be 
hired first in the rebuilding process.82  In a Martin Luther King Day speech on January 
17, 2006, which infamously came to be known as his “Chocolate City” speech, Nagin 
opined, “It’s time for us to rebuild a New Orleans, the one that should be a chocolate 
New Orleans.”83  The speech intended to pay tribute to New Orleans’ African-American 
residents. Nagin’s words, though, not only solicited the return of black residents but also 
reflected concerns about the area’s post-storm demographic composition, one he 
speculated could become less black and more white and brown.  
Though several media reports overstated nativist sentiment toward Latino 
newcomers, black (and white) fears of economic competition with low-wage Latino 
migrant workers existed alongside positive attitudes toward migrants between 2005-
2007.84  Due to increased job competition with recently arrived Latino migrant laborers, 
some black workers contended, their employment options were restricted and wages 
lowered.85  “I’m working for $6 an hour.  They’re bringing in Mexicans and expecting us 
to work for the same money.  Is slavery over, or what?” yelled one African–American 
man during Mayor Nagin’s first town hall meeting after Katrina in October 2005.86 
Expressions of cultural nativism beyond job competition also appeared.  When the 
government of neighboring Jefferson Parish passed an ordinance in June of 2007 that 
banned mobile food venders, critics claimed that the law intentionally targeted the 
numerous Latino-owned and operated taco trucks that had appeared during the two years 
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after Katrina. The law’s backers defended the measure as helping the parish return to pre-
storm normalcy, but others saw it as prejudiced toward foreign-born Latino entrepreneurs 
and their largely Hispanic clientele.87  
    
Rebuilding and Migrant Labor Rights Violations     
  The post-Katrina rebuilding environment offered both opportunity and hardship 
for migrant workers.  Though federal policy facilitated the migration and hiring of 
migrants in the rebuilding of New Orleans, limited government oversight placed migrant 
workers at high risk of employer exploitation.  Undocumented Latino workers, who made 
up a sizable portion of the post-hurricane workforce in New Orleans, were especially 
vulnerable to abuse, intimidation, and deportation.  As a result, opportunistic contractors 
and subcontractors – both large and small – were able to capitalize on these conditions to 
their financial benefit.  Wage theft, a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
defined as non-payment of hourly and/or overtime wages, became the most prevalent 
labor rights abuse that workers confronted in the two years after Katrina.  Meanwhile, 
amidst a climate of vulnerability and abuse, migrant workers faced unsafe working 
conditions and infrequent access to employer-sponsored healthcare.  Despite the 
increased demand for labor, employers were able to wield significant power over    
Latino migrant worker newcomers, many of whom were undocumented.    
Insufficient Department of Labor (DOL) oversight contributed to precarious post-
disaster labor conditions.  In the face of mounting evidence of worker rights violations 
during the year following Hurricane Katrina, DOL dedicated limited resources to hold 
employers accountable to labor laws and investigate migrant labor abuse claims in 
hurricane-affected areas.  DOL Secretary Elaine Chao stated that her department “has 
made a concerted effort to ensure workers involved in Hurricane Katrina recovery and 
cleanup know their rights and are paid all the wages they are owed.”88  Indeed, DOL 
carried out several investigations of employer abuse, leading to legal action against 
contractors.89  However, most migrant worker abuse cases went uninvestigated by DOL.  
Despite an influx of monolingual Spanish-speaking workers into the region, the agency 
provided few human resources to help Latino workers process unpaid wage claims and 
other abuses.  As of May 2006, the agency had only one permanent bilingual investigator 
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in Mississippi and four in Louisiana.  To complicate matters, Louisiana possessed no 
existing wage claim office.90 Consequently, workers had few avenues to voice labor 
violations and pursue legal recourse.  Compounded by many migrant workers’ 
undocumented status and limited understanding of U. S. labor laws, lax DOL 
enforcement exacerbated already ripe conditions for migrant worker abuse.  
As noted, non-payment of wages represented the most common and widespread 
labor rights violation migrant workers experienced in post-Katrina New Orleans.91  When 
Denis Soriano first arrived in New Orleans in February 2006, a contractor hired him and 
his friends for demolition work.  “He said he would pay us $200 a day.  We worked six 
days, and he paid each of us $1,200 that first week.  After working for twenty-two days, 
the contractor fired us, still owing us $3,000.  He never paid us a penny,” lamented 
Soriano.  Wage theft stories similar to Soriano’s abound.92 Antonia, a Latina who had 
lived in New Orleans prior to Katrina, returned to the city after the storm to work in 
demolition.  Despite working for several months and making frequent complaints about 
late paychecks, she was never paid.93  Employers withheld not only regular hourly wages 
but also overtime pay from workers.  Sergio Ferreira and other Brazilian construction 
workers, for instance, worked approximately eighty hours per week from November 28, 
2005 to March 3, 2006.  They were due more than $6,000 each in unpaid overtime wages 
that never came.94 Workers were additionally robbed of their wages through bouncing 
paychecks.95 
Wage theft placed considerable economic burdens on migrant workers, making 
them more vulnerable to mounting debt and homelessness.  In the aftermath of the 
hurricane, migrant workers often were dependent on their employers for food, housing 
and transportation.  Unemployment, then, could translate into restricted mobility and 
frequently, homelessness.  Cesar, a Latino demolition worker, recounted the economic 
dilemma many immigrant workers faced when their wages were withheld. “There wasn’t 
any other option [but to continue working] because many people didn’t have the money 
to return to the state where they had come from.  If they didn’t continue working for the 
company they’d be kicked out of the hotel and would have to sleep in the street.  And 
because of all of this, they had to continue. They were forced to do it,” he remarked.96 
The decision to continue or quit one’s job, moreover, was heavily influenced by the 
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possibility of not finding other work and earning enough income.  For undocumented 
workers, fears of deportation were always present.  In several cases, contractors 
capitalized on these fears by threatening to call “la migra” (immigration officials) when 
workers demanded unpaid wages.97  Undocumented workers, not surprisingly, were 
reluctant to approach authorities about wage claim issues because of their undocumented 
immigration status.  
A maze-like, multi-tiered hiring structure for reconstruction contracts facilitated 
non-payment of wages.  In the wake of the disaster, large contractors with federal 
government contracts frequently hired sub-contractors to carry out specific rebuilding 
projects and hire the necessary labor force.  Contractor payments to sub-contractors were 
often delayed and in some cases not paid at all.  Although numerous sub-contractors, 
including Hispanic immigrants, wished to regularly pay earned wages to their workers, 
many could not because larger contractors had failed to pay them.98  However, other 
subcontractors (Latinos included) capitalized on opportunities to underpay or withhold 
wages completely.99 Because of hiring systems that were often unclear and some 
contractors’ concealment of their business’s name and background information, migrant 
workers frequently did not even know the identity of their employer.  As a result, worker 
attempts to identify and locate their employers to address wage claims were made 
increasingly difficult.  Even so, certain contractors and subcontractors were held 
accountable for wage-related violations.    
 A set of lawsuits and settlements filed by migrant workers between 2005-2007 
points to the broad extent of wage theft by large employers and provides instances of 
organized worker resistance in post-Katrina New Orleans.  In Katrina’s aftermath, CH2M 
Hill, a Colorado-headquartered construction company, subcontracted with New Orleans-
based L&R Security to provide armed security at FEMA trailer sites and South Carolina-
based HKA Enterprises to hire workers for debris removal.  After a DOL investigation 
found that both subcontractors had failed to pay minimum and overtime wages to its 
workers, the companies agreed in 2007 to pay nearly $1 million in back wages.100  In a 
similar case, Belfor USA Group, a disaster recovery company, settled a collective action 
lawsuit filed in February 2006 by predominantly Latino migrant workers who alleged 
non-payment of overtime wages.  The company agreed to pay $223,000 to 163 workers 
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who were hired by Belfor subcontractors to perform cleanup in Louisiana, Mississippi 
and Alabama. Under the settlement, approximately two thousand Belfor employees 
became eligible for payment of withheld wages.101  In another case, LVI Environmental 
Services, a New Orleans construction firm, subcontracted with D & L Environmental to 
hire mostly Latino migrant workers to remove debris, mold, and mud from New Orleans 
public school buildings.102   A collective action lawsuit filed by employees in February 
2006 argued that LVI Environmental Services effectively used the subcontractor system 
to “evade responsibility to pay minimum wage and overtime wages as required by the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.”103  The company took advantage of the workers’ limited 
English proficiency and lack of understanding of U. S. labor laws, the suit contended, 
resulting in the non-payment and underpayment of wages.104  Wage theft, in sum, was 
widespread and affected both undocumented immigrant workers and legal guestworkers.  
Despite their legal immigration status, H-2B guestworkers were also targets of 
wage abuse. A collective action lawsuit filed by mostly Latino guestworkers in August 
2006 claimed that Decatur Hotels, which operated more than a dozen luxury hotels in 
New Orleans, violated minimum wage laws guaranteed under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA).105  The company recruited over three hundred immigrant workers from 
Peru, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic to carry out maintenance, housekeeping and 
hotel services in the fall of 2005.  Each worker had to pay between $3,000 and $5,000 up 
front to cover travel expenses, visas, and recruiting fees with the understanding that they 
would be reimbursed by the company upon arrival.  However, Decatur failed to 
reimburse the workers within the first week.  As a result, workers earned substantially 
less than the minimum wage in their first week of work.  Since they could not earn 
enough working for Decatur or lawfully work for other employers under H-2B 
regulations, the immigrant workers were forced into virtual debt peonage.  In May 2007, 
a district court ruled that H-2B guestworkers were protected by U. S. labor laws and 
upheld their right to recourse under FLSA labor rights provisions.106   
While non-payment of wages emerged as the principal labor abuse during the 
post-storm rebuilding process, migrant workers also faced dangerous conditions in the 
workplace.  Amidst toxic cleanup conditions and an atmosphere of lax workplace safety 
regulation, migrant workers confronted high risks of on-the-job injury and out-of-pocket 
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healthcare costs. Oral histories from demolition and cleanup workers portray unhealthy 
work climates and a parallel lack of safety equipment or training. 
The floodwaters that inundated New Orleans led to environmental health concerns 
for workers.  High levels of arsenic, bacteria, lead and other heavy metals were recorded 
in the sediment covering the city.107  Mold was an ubiquitous health hazard in flooded 
homes and buildings.  Despite such adverse conditions, employers infrequently and 
inconsistently provided protective equipment such as gloves, goggles, and respirators to 
workers performing demolition and gutting jobs.108  Many reported health problems 
including coughs, colds, cuts and bruises, recurring headaches and eye infections.109 “We 
were doing demolition work and gutting houses that were full of mud and carrying out 
refrigerators that contained old chicken,” recalled Denis Soriano. “[It was] a harsh 
situation and all the while, without any kind of protective gear.  So a lot of our friends got 
colds, allergies, and other sicknesses.”110 In other instances, contractors provided 
protective gear but without the necessary parts for proper function.111 “[The company] 
gave us masks with filters, and they changed the filters in the first and second weeks, but 
after a couple of weeks, they didn’t change them anymore,” explained a Brazilian 
construction worker.112  
Employers often failed to cover healthcare costs for injuries migrant workers 
sustained on the job.  While Denis Soriano was working a construction job in the spring 
of 2006, a several-thousand-pound trailer fell onto his right hand.  “Our boss didn’t want 
to call the ambulance at first, but my friend implored him to,” he recalled.  After surgery 
to repair his lacerated hand, Soriano had accrued thousands of dollars in hospital bills, 
while “not hearing anything from my employer.”113  In a similar case, Emilio, a Latino 
construction worker who broke his arm after falling off a ladder, was taken to a New 
Orleans hospital and left there by his employer.  He was then transferred to a hospital in 
Baton Rouge for treatment, which was not covered by his employer’s insurance policy. 
Consequently, he was obligated to pay his own medical bills.114  Such stories became 
commonplace during the two years following Katrina, as workers possessed limited 





Civil Society Responses   
Pervasive labor rights abuses not only transformed predominantly Latino migrant 
laborers into the newest class of Hurricane Katrina storm victims but also sparked civil 
society responses.   Despite the fact that employers were able to wield significant power 
over a vulnerable population of newcomers, migrant workers did not remain passive 
victims to labor rights violations but rather actively resisted them.  To accomplish this, 
workers forged alliances with local organizations that helped them advocate their 
positions and spearhead new migrant worker-led organizing initiatives.    
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), specializing in labor and immigrant 
rights became pivotal allies to migrant workers seeking justice in the two years after 
Hurricane Katrina.  As discussed earlier, worker defiance translated into lawsuits filed 
against large hotel, construction and cleanup contractors and ensuing settlements between 
2005 and 2007.  With assistance from public interest law NGOs such as the Southern 
Poverty Law Center, these lawsuits brought together both undocumented and legal 
immigrant workers in an effort to reclaim unpaid wages and otherwise remedy violations 
of their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act.115  Public-interest wage and 
immigration law clinics at Loyola University and non-profits such as the Pro-Bono 
Project also assisted immigrant workers to better understand their rights, file wage 
claims, fight evictions and navigate immigration laws. The Latino Health Outreach 
Project (LHOP), founded weeks after the hurricane in response to negligible bilingual 
healthcare for Latino residents and cleanup workers, provided both healthcare and 
advocacy for recently arrived migrant workers.116  Local faith-based social service 
agencies such as Catholic Charities and the Hispanic Apostolate of the Archdiocese of 
New Orleans also aided Latino migrant workers with immigration and humanitarian 
support services. NGOs formed after the hurricane also played especially pivotal roles in 
promoting member-based labor advocacy groups. 
 Migrant worker-led organizing efforts were in large part created through the 
formation of the New Orleans Worker Justice Coalition in December 2005.  The 
coalition, which consisted of local and national social justice organizers and groups, 
formed to address the problems that African-American residents and newly arrived 
migrant workers were facing in the hurricane-ravaged city.117 The Coalition collected 
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over one thousand worker testimonies and authored “And Injustice for All: Workers 
Lives in the Reconstruction of New Orleans,” a 2006 report chronicling issues of race 
and labor after Katrina.  In August 2006 the group helped create The New Orleans 
Worker Center for Racial Justice, an NGO whose mission is to “organize workers across 
lines of race and industry to advance racial justice and build the power and participation 
of poor and working class people of color in the post-Katrina landscape.”118 Since its 
founding, the Worker Center helped spark the formation of member-based, worker-led 
organizing projects such as the Alaianza de Trabajadores Huespedes (Guestworker 
Alliance for Dignity) and the Congreso de Jornaleros (Day Laborer Congress).  Because 
most Guestworker Alliance members have worked outside of the New Orleans area, 
further discussion here will focus on labor activism of day laborers and the Day Laborer 
Congress.119 
 
Day Laborer Organizing 
A spike in the area’s number of day laborers and gathering sites following Katrina 
signaled a new kind of labor market for New Orleans. “I’ve lived here for 20 years, and I 
don’t remember ever seeing day laborers standing by a gas station waiting to be offered a 
job,” recalled Martin Gutierrez, director of the Hispanic Apostolate.120  David Ware, a 
local immigration attorney, agreed. “We’ve never had Hispanic day labor sites.  That’s a 
totally new phenomenon,” he said.121  Large day labor sites emerged at Lee Circle in 
New Orleans’ Central Business District and in the suburbs of Gretna, Kenner and 
Metairie, where dozens to hundreds of mostly Hispanic male workers waited to secure 
work from passing contractors.122  Local businesses – construction supply stores, gas 
stations, and convenience stores – served as informal hiring centers where employers 
came daily to hire cheap, temporary labor for rebuilding jobs.  
How did migrant workers become day laborers? While many workers sought 
temporary jobs immediately upon arrival, Denis Soriano recalled how the drying up of 
regular work forced him and other recruited migrant workers to become day laborers.123  
“We lost our jobs and it was then that a lot of us started looking for work on the [street] 
corners.  There was no other option,” said Soriano.124  He began to wait every morning 
with dozens of other mostly Latino day laborers hoping to pick up work at the Shell gas 
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station at Lee Circle and then later, in front of the Home Depot in Gretna.125  While some 
workers stayed in motels, a shortage of affordable housing in New Orleans forced many 
day laborers to stay in abandoned flooded homes or sleep on the street near Lee Circle.  
Others found temporary residence in the “tent city” constructed by homeless workers in 
City Park. 
Not unlike recruited laborers and guestworkers, day laborers frequently fell victim 
to wage theft, on-the-job injury and insufficient protective equipment.  Because of their 
increased public presence in front of businesses, they routinely encountered police and 
immigration officials as well.126  Soriano summarized his experience as a day laborer. 
“When you’re on the corner, you become a day laborer. You become a victim of different 
abuses. You suffer abuse from immigration [officials] who come frequently to carry out 
raids. You become a victim of police brutality. The police chase you away and don’t give 
you the option to obtain work. They arrest you unjustly. A lot of times they beat you.  
You become victims of the employers who hire you and leave you [at the work site], who 
don’t pay you or who might pull out a gun when you ask for your pay.  So it becomes a 
form of violence. And it’s a situation that still gives you courage because you become a 
victim of unjust abuses.”127 Soriano and others sought to remedy their situation with the 
help of professional labor organizers.      
In late 2005 and early 2006 organizers from states with higher Latino and day 
labor populations arrived to assist the new migrant worker population.  The National Day 
Laborer Organizing Network, a member-based coalition of day laborer advocacy groups 
from around the country, and the Brooklyn, New York-based Latin American Workers 
Project, sent representatives to New Orleans to advise and organize day laborers.128  
Pablo Alvarado and Javier Gallardo, for instance, worked with hundreds of day laborers 
at multiple sites, educating workers about their labor rights and interceding in disputes 
with police.  In cooperation with the New Orleans Worker Justice Coalition and later, the 
New Orleans Worker Center for Racial Justice, these organizers were fundamental in 
helping to form the New Orleans Day Labor Congress during 2006.   
Over the next two years, with financial and staff support from the Worker Center, 
organizers recruited several hundred day laborers to form the city’s first day-labor 
organizing project, among the few that existed in the Deep South at the time.  Congreso 
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organizers, like Gallardo, intervened in disputes with employers and police and over 
time, inspired others to join organizing efforts.  Soriano described his initial attraction to 
the Congress.  He remarked, “there comes a moment as a worker when you get dumped 
on too much.  And so these bastards are screwing me over, screwing me over, you ask 
‘what are we going to do?’  But if you don’t have support from anyone, if you don’t have 
[immigration] papers, you say, ‘What do I do?’  And this was when I started to meet 
organizers from the Center.  They started coming to the corners and talking with the 
people.  When the workers were having problems with the police, they were there to 
intervene, to offer support to those who were arrested.”129  Organizers also assisted 
injured workers. When Soriano was in the hospital recovering from his hand injury, 
Gallardo frequently visited him and coordinated a fund-raising party for him and another 
injured worker.  Soriano soon began attending Congress meetings and working as a 
volunteer in early 2007.  Later that year, the Congress provided him with stipends to 
travel to the U. S. Social Forum, a national gathering of social justice organizations, in 
Atlanta and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network Conference in Washington  
D. C. where he networked with other day laborers and activists.130     
The Day Laborer Congress formed as the day labor population grew and the key 
issues facing temporary immigrant laborers – wage theft and negotiation of wages, 
workplace safety and heightened police and immigration intimidation – became more 
salient.  Meanwhile, business owners complained to police that day laborers loitered and 
littered on their property.  Tensions between businesses and day laborers in addition to 
heightened national political pressure to enforce immigration laws in 2006 more than 
likely influenced local and federal law enforcement officials in their decisions to conduct 
raids of day labor sites.    
 Multiple raids of day laborer gathering spots by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) and local police occurred between late 2005 and 2007. On the 
morning of March 17, 2006, ICE agents arrested forty Latino day laborers at Lee Circle.  
Twenty government cars, including ICE vehicles and New Orleans Police Department 
(NOPD) squad cars, advanced on Lee Circle, demanding that Hispanic workers display 
their identification. In an attempt to flee, one worker ran into an ICE agent, prompting 
felony charges of assaulting a federal officer.  More than half of the detainees were 
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released the same day while others, allegedly with criminal records, were detained longer 
and probably deported.131  In response to outcries by labor advocates that the raids 
unnecessarily targeted a desirable workforce, ICE spokesperson Temple Black responded 
that the raid was not part of a larger enforcement campaign but rather motivated by 
public safety concerns.  Apprehension of violent criminals and complaints from small 
businesses around Lee Circle perturbed by the large congregation of workers motivated 
the raid, he claimed.  "We're concerned about the bad guy; we want to catch the bad guy, 
the guy with a criminal record who might break the law or present a threat to public 
safety.  We're not that concerned with the Sheetrocker," Black stated.132   
ICE launched subsequent raids against immigrant workers in April 2006.  On 
April 2 agents raided a motel in Central City, a neighborhood adjacent to Lee Circle 
where large numbers of immigrant workers, many of whom were day laborers, were 
living.  Citing the need to look for tattoos as signs of gang affiliation, ICE agents, 
accompanied by NOPD officers, strip-searched workers in the parking lot of the motel.  
On April 25, ICE agents and Jefferson Parish Sheriff's deputies raided the Shell gas 
station at the corner of Veteran's Boulevard and Causeway in the suburban city of 
Metairie.  Approximately ten people were detained, including two Honduran women.  
The following day ICE officers went to the Midtown Motel in New Orleans’ Mid City 
neighborhood, where the motel’s management sought to evict immigrant workers the 
previous weekend.  Although all of the workers seem to have paid for their rooms 
through the end of the month, many feared arrest and fled.  Local advocates successfully 
intervened to prevent the eviction of those who remained.133  
Raids of day labor sites continued the next year.  Police arrests of day laborers at 
a Home Depot store in Gretna in February 2007 played a perhaps unexpected role in 
forging inter-racial alliances between Day Laborer Congress members and working–class 
black New Orleanians. “All of a sudden, six police patrols arrived and arrested seventeen 
workers including me and also the two organizers,” recalled Denis Soriano.134 Upon 
hearing of the trespassing arrest, the New Orleans Survivor Council, a local African-
American community organization that had earlier sought to build ties with the New 
Orleans Worker Center for Racial Justice, posted bail for the jailed workers. To show 
their gratitude, the day laborers formed a volunteer crew to renovate the lower Ninth 
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Ward flooded home of Ora Green, a member of the [Survivor] Council.  The day laborers 
later socialized with Green and other Concil members at a barbecue the same 
afternoon.135  
 Mutual aid between black grassroots organizations and day laborers served as a 
starting point for inter-racial political alliance building.  For Soriano, the importance of 
worker-led and multi-ethnic organizing became clearer after the Gretna raid and ensuing 
solidarity.  He commented that “the same people who are affected [by labor abuses] are 
the same people that need to be there working and deciding which projects to carry out. 
And we’ve seen that alone we’re not going to be able to do that much.  So that’s where 
the workers started saying that we should form alliances – alliances with schools, 
churches, leaders from the black community, leaders from the white community.  So that 
we begin to have the help, the strength that we need. So that we’re not just 15 or 30 day 
laborers but 100 people made up of day laborers, blacks and whites to fight against all of 
this.”136 Other Congress members shared this sentiment and began to participate in a 
number of community outreach efforts.    
Beginning in 2006 the Congress initiated a blend of cultural, economic and 
political activism.  Day laborers marched with hundreds of other pro-immigration 
activists on May 2, 2006 to protest federal legislation that sought to further criminalize 
undocumented migrant workers and their allies.  Later that year, Congress members 
started a theater project to educate other day laborers and the public at large about the 
struggles and rights of migrant workers.  The group performed at a day laborer 
conference in Houston and at a Congress-sponsored soccer tournament as part of a larger 
recruitment drive and “know your rights” education initiative. Outreach also extended 
outside of the day laborer community.  “Leadership groups” elected by the Congress 
visited local schools and community groups in an effort to dispel negative perceptions 
day laborers felt many New Orleanians had about Hispanic immigrants.  Denis Soriano 
explained that “the purpose is so that people understand why immigrants are here; what 
the economies are like in our countries in Latin America; and why the people are waiting 
on the street every day, what problems and abuses they face. And to show that the 
workers are not giving up but organizing themselves and confronting these injustices.”137    
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A multinational and multi-racial membership composed of mostly Latino and 
some African-American male day laborers presented several challenges. Workers and 
organizers had to address the obstacles that differences in income, race, ethnicity, 
national origin and language posed to successful multi-ethnic and multi-lingual labor 
organizing.  Latino and black day laborers from several temporary labor sites began 
meeting monthly to discuss worker rights, to strategize for building collective negotiating 
power and to overcome organizing hurdles.  Not unlike other day labor organizing 
struggles, wage negotiation became a subject of debate.  Black and Latino workers 
presented concerns that irregular work prompted many day laborers to accept 
exceptionally low-wages out of economic desperation, thereby driving others’ wages 
down.  Organizers initiated discussion about different solutions to the problem.  Cultural 
differences also became points of contention.  African-American day laborers explained 
that they often felt marginalized when Hispanic contractors arrived at a site and preferred 
to hire other Spanish-speaking Latino day laborers. Latino Congress members articulated 
that divisions existed between day laborers from Central America and Mexico as well.138 
Thus, labor organizing in post-Katrina New Orleans was shaped by both inter-ethnic 
solidarity and tension, as new immigrant communities of color and working-class African 





Hurricane Katrina marked a historical juncture for the city’s Latino population 
and workforce.  Before September 2005, Latin Americans, largely from Honduras, had 
intermittently migrated to New Orleans.  Many of these migrants emigrated legally and 
procured work in skilled trades and businesses, allowing them to become part of the 
metropolitan area’s middle class. Within weeks of the storm, tens of thousands of 
working-class Latino migrant workers traveled to the area in search of well-paying 
reconstruction jobs, transforming a modest-sized pre-hurricane Latino community into 
one significantly larger and more diverse.  Through a combination of word-of-mouth 
networking and direct employer recruitment, Latino workers, both legal and 
undocumented, made their way to the devastated city from within the United States as 
well as abroad.  While most reconstruction workers, like Denis Soriano, were already 
living in the country at the time of the storm and migrated internally, others arrived as 
employer-sponsored H2-B guestworkers, recruited by hiring agencies in their home 
countries.  
Federal policy responses in the months following Katrina fundamentally shaped 
post-hurricane worker migration, employment and labor conditions. The George W. Bush 
administration’s suspension of prevailing wages guaranteed under the Davis-Bacon Act 
made it easier for contractors to recruit and hire lower-wage migrant workers, while 
otherwise depressing construction wages in the region.  Relaxation of hiring requirements 
for undocumented workers by the Department of Homeland Security also contributed to 
rapid Latino worker migration to the Gulf South.  These federal policies were at odds 
with others.  Stepped-up Immigration and Customs Enforcement presence in the region 
and limited Department of Labor oversight of workplace abuse made migrant workers, 
particularly undocumented immigrants, exceptionally vulnerable to employer abuse.  
Consequently, migrant workers’ power to negotiate wages and file complaints was 
generally weakened, and undocumented migrants’ status became increasingly nebulous.  
A “rebuild above all else” climate, then, came to shape the on-the-ground reality 
of the rebuilding of New Orleans between 2005-2007; expedited reconstruction of the 
city took priority over the participation of local, African-American workers and the 
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protection of immigrant worker rights.  The rebuilding model that took hold prioritized 
streamlined hiring processes and labor market efficiency over maintaining living wages 
for workers and ensuring workers’ rights to earned wages and safe working 
environments.  As a result of these policy responses as well as the “structural 
embeddedness” of Latinos in the U. S. construction industry, worker social networks, and 
employer recruitment, tens of thousands of foreign-born migrant workers – 
predominantly Latino and many undocumented – traveled to New Orleans in search of 
work, coming to represent the bulk of New Orleans’ rebuilding workforce. 
Changes in federal labor and immigration laws, limited workplace oversight and 
employer opportunism coalesced to produce an especially precarious work environment 
for predominantly Latino construction workers.  Wage theft emerged as the most 
widespread labor rights violation in the two years after the hurricane, and undocumented 
immigrant workers were especially vulnerable to employer intimidation and abuse.  
Meanwhile, dangerous work environments, insufficient access to safety equipment, and 
denial of employer-sponsored healthcare became everyday realities for many workers.  
Even with high demand for labor in the aftermath of the hurricane, migrant 
workers’ negotiating power was significantly compromised by several key factors.  Upon 
arrival to the depopulated disaster zone around New Orleans during the fall of 2005, 
migrant laborers were often dependent on their employers for food, shelter and 
transportation.  When these essentials were denied to them, workers had few alternative 
options for subsistence.  Meanwhile, a confusing hiring system, in which workers 
frequently could not identify their employer, complicated efforts to follow-up on wage 
claims.  Fearful of prolonged unemployment and possible deportation (for undocumented 
immigrants), migrant wage theft victims were often reluctant to quit or speak out against 
labor abuse.  In many cases, employers took advantage of workers’ low English 
proficiency and limited knowledge of U. S. labor laws.  Undocumented Latin American 
immigrants, in particular, were especially vulnerable to workplace abuse, as employers 
threatened to call immigration officials when workers demanded unpaid wages.    
Race and class powerfully molded the experience of tens of thousands of 
displaced New Orleanians as well as the attitudes of local residents toward Hispanic 
newcomers.  African-Americans, who made up sixty-seven percent of the city’s 
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population prior to the hurricane, were disproportionately affected by the storm and faced 
significant obstacles to returning.  Pre-existing conditions of poverty, suspension of 
prevailing wages, a lack of adequate and affordable housing, and reduced personal 
financial resources contributed to many working-class black families’ delayed return or 
permanent displacement. Unable to return expeditiously, these residents were notably left 
on the margins of the rebuilding economy. More flexible than displaced New Orleanian 
workers in their willingness to work for lower wages and stay in motels, makeshift 
campgrounds, abandoned houses and jobs sites, Latino migrant workers arrived to fill the 
post-disaster labor demand.  
Several additional factors aggravated this potential for racial conflict.  While New 
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Louisiana Senator Mary Landreiu advocated for 
reconstruction jobs going to displaced residents, they also promulgated racial tension by 
casting Latino migrants as job-stealers.  As Nagin infamously asked in October 2005, 
“How do I ensure that New Orleans is not overrun by Mexican workers?”  News media 
overstated anti-migrant worker stances, and in doing so, inadvertently helped to veil the 
reasons why many poor New Orleans residents could not return to the city and find work.  
Eager to capitalize on forthcoming privately and federally financed rebuilding contracts, 
predominantly out-of-state contractors arrived to the metropolitan area in the days and 
weeks after the hurricane and began hiring chiefly Latino migrant workers to meet the 
labor demand.  A no-bid contract award process that did not favor local, minority-owned 
firms additionally left many locally owned companies on the sidelines; suspension of 
federal affirmative action laws made it even more difficult for black workers to procure 
employment.    
Many social commentators have observed that Hurricane Katrina was not just a 
natural catastrophe, but a human-made disaster as well, owing to the ineffectiveness of 
both leaders and levee engineers.  The present study has argued that in the case of Latino 
migrant workers, the human-made disaster was particularly onerous because it arose 
more from institutional manipulation than simple ineptitude.  Federal and state authorities 
deliberately relaxed labor standards without adequate oversight of employers, setting the 
stage for egregious exploitation of migrant workers, especially Latinos; Meanwhile, 
local, predominantly black workers were largely marginalized from the rebuilding 
  
32 
economy.  As noted, however, Latino worker activists rejected the “rebuild above all 
else” recovery model.  Assisted by grassroots allies, newly formed migrant worker-led 
advocacy organizations, such as the Day Laborer Congress, carved out new spaces for 
economic, political and cultural resistance. Bi-racial and multi-ethnic labor organizing 
and alliance building offered both opportunities and challenges in this process. Pervasive 
labor strife tempered by solidarity and activism, then, came to mark a significant number 
of Latino migrant workers’ experiences in the Crescent City as they resisted becoming 
Hurricane Katrina’s newest class of victims and instead become the city’s newest 
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